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Information Privacy in Public Space: Location




Location information can be broadly defined as any data which places one at a
particular location at any given point in time, or at a series of locations over time.1
Location data can be used singly or in combination to create a data picture of one’s
movements in public space.2 There are myriad ways in which individuals leave
location data in the hands of private sector organizations.3 ATM records and re-
ceipts of electronic transactions in shops both provide information about one’s ac-
tivities at particular points in time and space, as do cell phones,4 surveillance cam-
era footage, and RFID data.5
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Common Law Section. I gratefully acknowledge the support of the GEOIDE Network
and the Canada Research Chairs program. I gratefully acknowledge the research
assistance of Kelly Harris. Many thanks to Elizabeth F. Judge for her comments on an
earlier draft of this paper.
1 Note that this definition is different from some definitions in works that focus more
specifically on privacy issues with location based services. See e.g. David Lyon, Ste-
phen Marmura & Pasha Peroff, Location Technologies: Mobility, Surveillance and Pri-
vacy, Queen’s University: The Surveillance Project (March 2005) at 6, online: The Sur-
veillance Project <http://www.surveillanceproject.org/files/loctech.pdf>. A narrower
definition permits a focus on those technologies that permit tracking in real time. A
broader definition is chosen here because the discussion is about both the impact of
adding location data to other information about an identifiable individual and about the
expectation of privacy that individual might have in activities taking place in the spaces
identified by that location data.
2 Anne Uteck considers as well the implications of ubiquitous computing for the fine-
grained tracking and monitoring of daily activities. See Anne Uteck, “Ubiquitous Com-
puting and Spatial Privacy” in Ian Kerr et. al., eds., Lessons from the Identity Trail:
Anonymity, Privacy and Identity in a Networked Society (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2009) at 83–102, online: On the Identity Trail
<http://www.idtrail.org/files/ID%20Trail%20Book/9780195372472_kerr_05.pdf>.
3 For a detailed discussion of technologies relying upon location based information, see
Sjaak Nouwt, “Reasonable Expectations of Geo-Privacy?” (2008) 5:2 SCRIPTed 375,
online: <http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/ahrc/script-ed/vol5-2/nouwt.pdf>.
4 Mobile Location Systems can work with cell phones to give a precise position for a cell
phone. This type of technology has advantages for the delivery of emergency services,
but raises privacy concerns as well. See e.g. Nouwt, supra note 3.
5 See Teresa Scassa et al., “Consumer Privacy and Radio Frequency Identification Tech-
nology” (2005-2006) 37 University of Ottawa Law Review at 215–248. RFIDs that
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Increasingly, we are invited to leave even more detailed location data trails.
Individuals can enable tracking features on handheld mobile devices so that they
can use the device as a navigation system that can offer them route directions as
well as local merchant information.6 Users of such devices will leave a record of
their movements and activities for the periods of time in which the application is
enabled. Individuals are also increasingly invited to enable tracking applications on
hand held devices so as to permit selected “friends” to be able to track their move-
ments and activities.7 Enabling these features also leaves a trail of location data in
the hands of the service provider. Typically, the collection, use and disclosure of
this information by the service provider is governed by a user agreement. The terms
of the agreement, and any associated privacy policy, may or may not address what
the company’s position is with respect to requests from law enforcement to access
to data about individual users.8 As will be discussed below, the nature, variety and
volume of location data that is collected about individuals, in all of these different
contexts, is significant and growing. Kerr et al. describe the “universalization of
such data collection processes” as “soft surveillance.”9
The sheer volume of location data that is now being collected by private sector
companies in relation to a wide range of products and services poses serious chal-
lenges for privacy and data protection law. This article considers a central chal-
lenge to privacy posed by the collection and compilation of location data — the
accessibility of this data to law enforcement agents through exceptions to the gen-
eral principles of consent for disclosure that exist under private sector data protec-
tion legislation in Canada. Recent court interpretations of these exceptions — pri-
marily in the internet context — paint a muddled picture of their relationship to the
right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure under the Canadian Charter
leave location data trails include those in automated bridge or highway toll passes, and
in swipe cards that permit entry into secured areas. RFID-enabled identity documents
may also leave data trails. As the use of RFID across a whole range of goods becomes
more common, the trail of location data may expand.
6 For example, TomTom, the popular seller of GPS systems, advertises an application
that will tell drivers where to find the lowest fuel prices in their area, online: TomTom
<http://www.tomtom.com/services/service.php?id=12>.
7 Google Latitude is one of many such applications, online:
<http://www.google.com/intl/en_us/latitude/intro.html>. Others include GypSii, online:
<http://www.gypsii.com/>, Whrrl, online: <http://whrrl.com>, and Loopt, online:
<http://www.loopt.com/>.
8 For a discussion on the formal and informal practices of information sharing with au-
thorities in the Canadian private sector, see Tamil Israel et al., “Personal Information
Protection in the Face of Crime and Terror: Information Sharing by Private Enterprises
for National Security and Law Enforcement Purposes” (March 2008) Centre for Inno-
vation Law and Policy, online: Centre for Innovation Law and Policy
<http://www.innovationlaw.org/Assets/Privacy+report.pdf>.
9 Ian Kerr et al., “Soft Surveillance, Hard Consent: The Law and Psychology of Engi-
neering Consent” in Ian Kerr, et al., eds., Lessons from the Identity Trail: Anonymity,
Privacy and Identity in a Networked Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009)
at 5–22, online:
<http://www.idtrail.org/files/ID%20Trail%20Book/9780195372472_Kerr_01.pdf>.
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of Rights and Freedoms.10 This article considers whether the permissive disclosure
provisions of the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act11
(PIPEDA) and its substantially similar counterparts mean that law enforcement
agents have ready access to information about our movements and activities, or
whether s. 8 of the Charter plays a role in limiting the circumstances in which
disclosure without notice or consent may take place.
Section 8 of the Charter guarantees only the freedom from unreasonable
search and seizure. Thus, this section only applies where there is a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy.12 The existence of a reasonable expectation of privacy is,
thus, the first issue in considering the application of s. 8 to location data in the
hands of third parties. While information about one’s movements and activities
seems, prima facie, to be “core biographical information”, there is a risk that the
apparently public nature of many of these activities eliminates or reduces any rea-
sonable expectation of privacy. The first part of this article addresses this possibil-
ity, and argues that even if one were to accept that there is no reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in public space, there is generally a reasonable expectation of
privacy in recorded data about one’s movements.
The second part of the article assesses the impact of data protection legislation
on the constitutional issues. Cases involving cell phone data, as well as the recent
and controversial case law relating to internet service providers’ disclosure of sub-
scriber information to police without warrants suggests that, while s. 8 of the Char-
ter may play some role in limiting disclosure without consent, complicating factors
may include the terms of the company’s privacy policy, the wording of the statu-
tory exception, the nature of the information sought, and the court’s conception of
the information at issue and its significance. This article considers the impact that
the proposed Bills C-46 and C-47, the Investigative Powers for the 21st Century Act
and the Technical Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (BILL C-47),13 would have
in this context, and concludes with an assessment of the state of the current law.
10 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11, s. 8.
11 S.C. 2000, c. 5 [PIPEDA].
12 Canada (Director of Investigation & Research, Combines Investigation Branch) v.
Southam Inc., 1984 CarswellAlta 121, (sub nom. Hunter v. Southam Inc.) [1984] 2
S.C.R. 145, ¶159 (S.C.C.) [Hunter].
13 Bill C-46, An Act to amend the Criminal Code, the Competition Act, and the Mutual
Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act, 40th Sess., 2nd Parl., 2009 [Bill C-46]; Bill
C-47, An Act regulating telecommunications facilities to support investigations, 40th
Sess., 2nd Parl., 2009 [Bill C-47], online: Parliament of Canada
<http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?DocId=4007628
&Language=e&Mode=1&>.
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I. THE REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IN PUBLIC
SPACE
Courts have frequently found that individuals have little or no expectation of
privacy with respect to activities they carry out in public space.14 Those who have
“voluntarily exposed themselves to public gaze”15 are said to have little basis for
complaint if their behavior is observed by others.16 To frame it another way, “a
person can have no reasonable expectation of privacy in what he or she knowingly
exposes to the public, or to a section of the public, or abandons in a public place.”17
Section 8 of the Charter guarantees freedom from “unreasonable search and
seizure” by agents of the state. In Hunter v. Southam Inc.,18 Chief Justice Dickson
of the Supreme Court of Canada stated: 
The guarantee of security from unreasonable search and seizure only pro-
tects a reasonable expectation. This limitation on the right guaranteed by s.
8, whether it is expressed negatively as freedom from “unreasonable” search
and seizure, or positively as an entitlement to a “reasonable” expectation of
privacy, indicates that an assessment must be made as to whether in a partic-
ular situation the public’s interest in being left alone by government must
give way to the government’s interest in intruding on the individual’s pri-
vacy in order to advance its goals, notably those of law enforcement.19
The reasonable expectation of privacy is an objective standard, and it depends
not just upon what the affected individual expects in relation to her privacy but also
on what the reasonable person would expect in the circumstances. Therefore, it
could be argued that, as the use of certain technologies becomes more widespread
and more powerful, the reasonable expectation of privacy in public places will nec-
essarily diminish. This includes not only obvious surveillance of public spaces
through technologies such as video surveillance, but also the ever-increasing data
trails we leave as we surf the internet, bank, shop, dine out, travel, or simply talk on
the phone. The very activities that intrude on consumer privacy become illustra-
tions of how consumers have no expectation of privacy.20
14 See e.g. Druken v. R.G. Fewer & Associates Inc. (1998), [1998] N.J. No. 312, 171
Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 312, 1998 CarswellNfld 289, ¶43 (Nfld. T.D.) [Druken]. See also R. v.
Shortreed (1990), 54 C.C.C. (3d) 292 (Ont. C.A.); R. v. Dilling (1993), 84 C.C.C. (3d)
325 (B.C. C.A.); leave to appeal refused (1994), 31 C.R. (4th) 406 (note) (S.C.C.); R. v.
Hounsell (1994), [1994] N.J. No. 319, 1994 CarswellNfld 343 (Nfld. Prov. Ct.); R. v.
Abbey (2006), [2006] O.J. No. 4689, 2006 CarswellOnt 7381 (Ont. S.C.J.).
15 Gill v. Hearst Publishing Co., 40 Cal. 2d 224, 253 P. 2d 441 (1953). For a detailed and
comparative discussion of this issue, see Elizabeth Paton-Simpson, “Privacy and the
Reasonable Paranoid: The Protection of Privacy in Public Places” (2000) 50 U. T. L .J.
305.
16 Silber v. British Columbia Television Broadcasting System Ltd. (1985), [1986] 2
W.W.R. 609 (B.C. S.C.); Druken, supra note 14.
17 R. v. Stillman, [1997] 1 S.C.R. 607, ¶40 (S.C.C.).
18 Supra note 12.
19 Ibid. at 159-160. Emphasis in original.
20 Nouwt, supra note 3 at 395, also notes that the “reasonable expectation of privacy”
norm creates the risk of erosion of privacy as technology advances. Stanley A. Cohen,
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It is not just the ever-increasing recording of our daily activities that arguably
erodes our expectation of privacy; where state purposes such as law enforcement
and national security become accepted as necessarily overriding private interests in
a growing range of contexts, the reasonableness of any expectation of privacy may
be further diminished.21 It becomes (arguably) no longer reasonable to expect pri-
vacy, because technology, combined with an apparent social acceptance of surveil-
lance for security purposes, means that individuals can be taken to have surren-
dered all or part of their privacy interests in those contexts. Stringham suggests that
“[w]hen state surveillance uses ubiquitous technologies, constitutional privacy pro-
tection may be diminished as social conventions have already adapted to them.”22
Yet, the Supreme Court of Canada has cautioned that the reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy should not turn on the reasonableness of one’s expectations in a
context in which privacy is increasingly eroded by technologies of surveillance and
data collection. Rather, the analysis should focus on the balance between one’s pri-
vacy interests and other compelling public interests.23 As Cohen notes, “[t]he fact
that an area is public should not lead inexorably to the conclusion that there can be
no reasonable expectation of privacy in that place.”24 Although one’s right of pri-
vacy in public space must give way to the rights of other participants in that same
space to observe what goes on around them, it by no means follows that one’s right
of privacy must give way with respect to data collected and recorded by public and
private sector actors for a variety of specific purposes. Further, consent to the col-
lection of discrete data particles is not necessarily consent to their matching and
mining, or their transfer to other parties.25
Privacy, Crime and Terror: Legal Rights and Security in a Time of Peril (Markham,
Ont.: Butterworths, 2005) at 34-35, also echoes concerns that encroachments on pri-
vacy in public space may diminish expectations of privacy, although he argues that
they should not automatically do so.
21 This view is reflected in the reasons of Justice Bastarache in R. v. Brown, 2008 SCC
18, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 456 (S.C.C.), [Kang-Brown]. It is also explored in greater detail in
Cohen, ibid.; See also Jennifer Chandler, “Privacy Versus National Security: Clarifying
the Trade-Off” in Ian Kerr et al., eds., Lessons from the Identity Trail: Anonymity,
Privacy and Identity in a Networked Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009)
at 5–22, online: On the Identity Trail
<http://www.idtrail.org/files/ID%20Trail%20Book/9780195372472_Kerr_07.pdf>.
22 James A.Q. Stringham, “Reasonable Expectations Reconsidered: A Return to the
Search for a Normative Core for Section 8?” (2005) 23 C.R. (6th) 245 at 251; Daniel
J. Solove, The Digital Person: Technology and Privacy in the Information Age
(New York: New York University Press, 2004) at 35, also discusses the social
impact of the normalization of surveillance.
23 R. v. Patrick, 2009 SCC 17 (S.C.C.) [Patrick]; Tessling, supra note 17.
24 Cohen, supra note 20 at 34-35.
25 Data protection legislation makes it clear that consent must be obtained for the collec-
tion of data for specified purposes. Separate consent is required if the data is later to be
used for other purposes. See e.g. PIPEDA, supra note 11, Sch. 1, cl. 4.3.1; Personal
Information Protection Act, S.B.C. 2003, c. 63, ss. 7, 10 [PIPA (B.C.)]; Personal Infor-
mation Protection Act, S.A. 2003, c. P-6.5, ss. 7, 13 [PIPA (Alberta)].
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In Aubry v. Les Éditions Vice-Versa inc.,26 the Supreme Court of Canada
noted that, while persons photographed in public places generally have no basis for
complaint about the publication of the photo in the media, this was only if their
inclusion in the photo was incidental. The Court stated: “the public nature of the
place where a photograph was taken is irrelevant if the place was simply used as a
background for one or more persons who constitute the true subject of the photo-
graph.”27 In a recent decision involving a civil action for invasion of privacy, Jus-
tice Soldevila of the Quebec Superior Court stated: 
. . . une personne demeure dans le cadre de sa vie privée lorsqu’elle est sur
sa propriété, circule dans la rue et vaque à ses occupations habituelles,
même si elle le fait à la vue de tous. Elle conserve donc en tout temps le
droit de ne pas être observée et suivie systématiquement.28
In both Aubry and Tremblay, the context changes once an individual’s pres-
ence or movements in public space become the focus of specific attention.29
(a) Characterizing the Privacy Interest
The context-sensitive nature of the reasonable expectation of privacy has
pushed courts to develop a framework for determining what makes an expectation
of privacy reasonable. An early approach saw Canadian courts divide privacy inter-
ests into three categories: personal, territorial and informational.30 An individual’s
reasonable expectation of privacy varied depending on the classification of the pri-
vacy interest.
Personal privacy reflects the right an individual has to control over their physi-
cal person, and as such, is given a high level of protection by the courts.31 “Per-
sonal” in this context is not a synonym for “private”, but refers to one’s physical
person. Personal privacy “protects bodily integrity, and in particular the right not to
have our bodies touched or explored to disclose objects or matters we wish to con-
ceal.”32 The right to personal privacy protects against unreasonable searches of
one’s body, the taking of blood or tissue samples, and other physically invasive
searches.
However, territorial or spatial privacy recognizes an individual’s privacy inter-
ests in a particular geographical space. For example, a person has a strong privacy
26 Aubry c. Éditions Vice Versa Inc., 1998 CarswellQue 4806, (sub nom. Aubry v.
Éditions Vice-Versa inc.) [1998] 1 S.C.R. 591 (S.C.C.) [Aubry].
27 Ibid. at para. 59.
28 Tremblay c. Cie d’assurances Standard Life, [2008] J.Q. No. 5252, 2008 QCCS 2488,
2008 CarswellQue 5339 (Que. S.C.) at para 59 [Tremblay].
29 Uteck considers this to flow from a loss of the anonymity that typically characterizes
one’s activities in public space. Supra, note 2 at 93.
30 See e.g. R. v. Dyment, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 417, ¶19-20 (S.C.C.) [Dyment]. These divisions
are not absolute. In Patrick, supra note 23 at para. 26, the Supreme Court of Canada
cautions that personal, territorial and informational privacy interests may frequently
overlap.
31 See e.g. R. v. Phoretsky, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 945 (S.C.C.).
32 Tessling, supra note 17 at para 21.
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interest in their home, as it is “the place where our most intimate and private activi-
ties are most likely to take place.”33 While apartment-dwellers will have a privacy
interest in their apartments, a home owner’s privacy interest extends to the sur-
rounding land owned by her.34 Spaces other than the home that have privacy signif-
icance may also be given some protection. Such spaces might include one’s car,35 a
hotel room,36 a rented locker,37 or even spaces occupied by one’s belongings such
as a purse or backpack.38
Territorial privacy only protects a particular space as it relates to an individual.
In other words, privacy “protects people not places.”39 Even though territorial pri-
vacy case law identifies and assesses the reasonable expectation of privacy in the
context of a particular space, the existence, or location of that space is not inher-
ently private. What takes place within one’s home may be considered highly pri-
vate, but the location of one’s home — the street address — is information in the
public domain. Location information as such is not typically protected by notions
of territorial privacy. It is considered to have privacy dimensions only to the extent
that it is personal information and, hence, it is typically considered under an “infor-
mational privacy” analysis.40
“Informational privacy” reflects one’s privacy interests “[b]eyond our bodies
and the places where we live and work.”41 Although physically unbounded, “infor-
mation” about oneself and the ability to control it is central to dignity and integrity
33 Ibid. at para. 22.
34 See discussion of Binnie J. in Tessling, ibid. at para. 22; See also R. v. Kokesch, [1990]
3 S.C.R. 3 at 17-18 (S.C.C.); R. v. Grant, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 223 at 237 (S.C.C.); R. v.
Wiley, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 263 at 273 (S.C.C.).
35 R. v. Belnavis, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 341 (S.C.C.) [Belnavis].
36 R. v. Wong, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 36 (S.C.C.).
37 R. v. Buhay, 2003 SCC 30, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 631 (S.C.C.).
38 Tessling, supra note 17 at 68; per Binnie J. Territorial privacy protection does not nec-
essarily extend to spaces occupied by virtue of relationships, however intimate, such as
the car of a close friend (Belnavis, supra note 35 at paras. 22-23); or a girlfriend’s
apartment (R. v. Edwards, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 128 (S.C.C.) [Edwards]).
39 Patrick, supra note 23 at para. 14 citing Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347 at 351 (U.S. S.C.,
1967). For a critique of this concept, see Uteck, supra note 2 at 101.
40 Uteck, supra note 2, is critical of an approach that ignores the spatial privacy dimen-
sions of location information. Certainly, when one compares the court of appeal (R. v.
Tessling (2003), [2003] O.J. No. 186, 63 O.R. (3d) 1, 2003 CarswellOnt 181 (Ont.
C.A.); leave to appeal allowed (2003), 2003 CarswellOnt 5831 (S.C.C.); reversed
(2004), 2004 CarswellOnt 4351 (S.C.C.)) and Supreme Court of Canada decisions in
Tessling, supra note 12, one can see the difference that a spatial privacy analysis can
make to the outcome. This contrast is evident as well between the dissenting opinion at
the Alberta Court of Appeal in Patrick (R. v. Patrick, 2007 ABCA 308 (Alta. C.A.);
affirmed (2009), 2009 CarswellAlta 481 (S.C.C.)) and the Supreme Court of Canada’s
decision; Patrick, supra note 23. However, in the context of this paper, it is difficult to
escape the informational privacy dimensions of location information, particularly in
regard to its relationship with data protection legislation.
41 Tessling, supra note 17 at para. 23.
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of the person.42 Informational privacy raises “the thorny question of how much
information about ourselves and [our] activities we are entitled to shield from the
curious eyes of the state.”43 The nature and level of the informational privacy inter-
est is very data and context specific. For some time, Canadian courts have focused
on giving the highest level of protection to a “biographical core of personal infor-
mation”,44 according little weight to other forms of personal information. This bio-
graphical core of information was described in R. v. Plant45 as being information
“which individuals in a free and democratic society would wish to maintain and
control from dissemination to the state. This would include information which
tends to reveal intimate details of the lifestyle and personal choices of the indivi-
dual.”46 This concept has proven unwieldy, as it has involved courts passing judg-
ment on what information “tends to reveal” details, and what details relate to “lifes-
tyle and personal choices.”47 In critiquing this formulation as essentially circular,
Pomerance writes: “[the courts] tell us that s. 8 will only protect the privacy of
information if the information is inherently private.”48 In R. v. M. (A.),49 Justice
Binnie cautioned against making decisions about privacy based on the categoriza-
tion of the information at issue. He wrote: 
In Dyment, Plant and Tessling, the various categories of “information” (in-
cluding “biographical core of personal information”) were used as a useful
analytical tool, not a classification intended to be conclusive of the analysis
of information privacy. Not all information that fails to meet the “biographi-
cal core of personal information” test is thereby open to the police.”50
This statement counters a trend towards a more restricted view of the kind of
information in which one has a privacy interest.51 Because of the growing ease
42 Dyment, supra note 30 at para. 22.
43 Ibid.
44 This phrase surfaced in R. v. Plant, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 281 at 293 (S.C.C.) [Plant].
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid. at 293.
47 In Tessling, supra note 17 at para. 26; Justice Binnie noted that this statement relating
to “lifestyle and personal choices” was not meant to be exhaustive of the kind of infor-
mation that would be protected, however, this did become a focal point for many
courts.
48 Renée M. Pomerance, “Shedding Light on the Nature of Heat: Defining Privacy in the
Wake of R. v. Tessling” (2005) 23 C.R. (6th) 229 at 233.
49 R. v. M. (A.), 2008 CarswellOnt 2257, 2008 SCC 19, 55 C.R. (6th) 314 (S.C.C.).
50 Ibid. at para. 68.
51 This approach is evident in a number of cases. For example, in R. v. Wilson (February
10, 2009), Court File No.: 4191/08 (Ont. S.C.) [Wilson]; Leitch J. of the Ontario Supe-
rior Court found that there was no expectation of privacy in an internet subscriber’s
name and address, even though in the case, the police were interested in this data be-
cause it was the key to linking an individual to certain internet-based activities. Leitch
J. rejected the finding of Gorewich J. in a similar case that linking subscriber informa-
tion with internet activities did in fact amount to information that would “tend to dis-
close intimate details of lifestyle and activities” — R. v. Kwok (2008), [2008] O.J. No.
2414, 2008 CarswellOnt 2634, ¶35 (Ont. C.J.) [Kwok]; In R. v. Vasic (2009), [2009]
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with which apparently innocuous information can be linked to and matched with
other data, a more flexible approach to assessing the privacy interest in information
is warranted. A single piece of information can convert anonymous data into highly
sensitive personal information about identifiable individuals.52 In Tessling, Binnie
J. acknowledged that advances in technology could change the nature and quantity
of information being gathered, thus, requiring departures from earlier case law.53
In Tessling, the heat signature data gathered by the police using aerial Forward
Looking Infrared (FLIR) technology merely measured the heat emanating from a
house. The court ruled that this was not core biographical information.54 As a re-
sult, the gathering of the information, which took place without physical intrusion,
did not violate Charter rights to privacy, notwithstanding the fact that technology
was needed to obtain and record it. Location information about an individual is less
likely to be treated in this manner, as it is directly generated by the actions and
choices of an individual. In other words, it conveys a direct message about where
an individual was at a particular point in time, which in turn tells us something
about that individual’s choices and activities. The greater risk with location infor-
mation is that it will be considered as a simple proxy for what was easily and read-
ily observable at the time. In other words, if a person had no reasonable expectation
of privacy in their passage from one point in the city to another, using city streets,
then what expectation of privacy would they have in data that simply recorded this
transit?
O.J. No. 685, 2009 CarswellOnt 846 (Ont. S.C.J.) [Vasic], Thorburn J. also accepted
that providing account information to someone in possession of an IP address might
result in access to core biographical data. These cases are discussed in more detail
below.
52 See e.g. Wilson, ibid. This point is also made in the access to information context in
Gordon v. Canada (Minister of Health), 2008 FC 258, 324 F.T.R. 94 (F.C.). It should
be noted that the significance of this issue may be ignored by courts in some cases. For
example, in R. v. Ward (2008), [2008] O.J. No. 3116, 2008 CarswellOnt 4728 (Ont.
C.J.) [Ward], the court notes that an internet protocol (IP) address is a piece of informa-
tion that conveys nothing significant about an individual. This is only true in the ab-
stract. If the IP address is the key to linking a variety of internet activities to that indivi-
dual, then the IP address becomes a very significant piece of information.
53 Tessling, supra note 17 at paras. 25–29; In R. v. Mahmood (2008), [2008] O.J. No.
3922, 79 W.C.B. (2d) 366, 2008 CarswellOnt 5907 (Ont. S.C.J.); additional reasons at
(2009), 2009 CarswellOnt 4520, ¶65 (Ont. S.C.J.) [Mahmood], the court echoes this in
noting the need for analytical flexibility as technology advances.
54 This decision has been widely criticized. See e.g. Ian Kerr & Jena McGill, “Emana-
tions, Snoop Dogs and Reasonable Expectations of Privacy”, (2007) 52 Crim. L.Q. 392
at 431, online: On the Identity Trail <http://www.idtrail.org/files/kerr_mcgill_-_emana-
tions_snoop_dogs_and_reasonable_expectations_of_priva.pdf>; See also Pomerance,
supra note 48; Stringham, supra note 22; Steve Coughlan & Marc S. Gorbet, “Nothing
Plus Nothing Equals . . . Something? A Proposal for FLIR Warrants on Reasonable
Suspicion” (2005) 23 C.R. (6th) 239.
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(b) The Contextualized Approach
In Tessling, the Supreme Court of Canada offered a framework for assessing
the existence of a reasonable expectation of privacy in the information privacy con-
text.55 Justice Binnie drew this test from R. v. Edwards,56 an earlier decision of that
Court which dealt with an issue of territorial or spatial privacy. The migration of
the test to the context of an informational privacy case suggests a more unified
approach that regards the nature of the privacy interest in a broader context. The
Tessling approach first considers whether the individual had a subjective expecta-
tion of privacy in the information gathered, and then asks whether that expectation
was objectively reasonable. In order to assess the objective reasonableness of the
expectation, the Court identified the following factors for consideration:
a) the place where the alleged “search” occurred;
b) whether the subject matter was in public view;
c) whether the subject matter had been abandoned;
d) whether the information was already in the hands of third par-
ties; if so, was it subject to an obligation of confidentiality?
e) whether the police technique was intrusive in relation to the
privacy interest;
f) whether the use of surveillance technology was itself objec-
tively unreasonable;
g) whether the [technology used] exposed any intimate details of
the respondent’s lifestyle, or information of a biographical
nature.57
The first consideration indicates that location may be relevant — it incorpo-
rates a territorial privacy dimension to the analysis. The second relates to the visi-
bility of the item or activity. Both considerations suggest that there may be little or
no expectation of privacy in things that may be readily observed.
Activities that may be observed by anyone in the general vicinity would cer-
tainly fall within the category of things in public view.58 It is less clear that re-
corded information — such as that captured by video cameras — is information “in
public view.”59 There are many who would argue that such activity is necessarily
in public view, and that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy where cam-
55 This framework is reaffirmed in Patrick, supra note 23 at paras. 26-27.
56 Edwards, supra note 38.
57 Tessling, supra note 17 at para. 32.
58 In the U.S., for example, there is case law to the effect that a warrant is not needed for
police to place a tracking device on a car, as this device will only track movements
otherwise open to public observation. U.S. v. Knotts, 480 U.S. 276 (1983) (regarding a
tracking device on a container carried in a vehicle); See also U.S. v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705
(1984); U.S. v. Garcia, 474 F. 3d 994 (7th Cir. 2007). The situation is otherwise in
Canada — see R. v. Wise, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 527 (S.C.C.).
59 Indeed, Lai argues that public video surveillance engages s. 8 of the Charter — see
Derek Lai, “Public Video Surveillance by the State: Policy, Privacy Legislation, and
the Charter” (2007) 45 Alta L. Rev. 43.
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eras in public spaces record the activities of passers-by.60 The use of surveillance
cameras in public spaces is often justified on the basis that these cameras only re-
cord events otherwise open to public view. It is argued that if a person is in public
view, she cannot prevent others from observing her activities, mannerisms, clothing
or companions.61 Some would even go so far as to say that the widespread use of
video cameras in public spaces drastically reduces the reasonableness of any expec-
tation of privacy, as people realize that they may be under observation at any time
and in virtually any public place.62
Recorded location information is of a different character from observations of
individuals in public space. To begin with, the quality of the information is fre-
quently richer than casual observation. For example, while the use of a cell phone
on a city street may reveal that the caller (or recipient of a call) was in a particular
geographic area at a specific point in time, the fact that this could also have been
observed by others who were in that precise area at the time, and who happened to
notice the person using their phone, does not mean that the recorded data is merely
a representation of what was in public view. The recorded data will also reveal the
identities of the caller and of the recipient of the call, and this information goes
well beyond what could be observable by bystanders. As surveillance camera tech-
nology continues its rapid evolution, individuals captured in images may also be-
come identifiable in ways that would not be possible through mere observation by
bystanders or even by human surveillance agents. Recorded data is of an entirely
different character from human observation, and the advancing technology for re-
fining, matching and sorting this data makes it even more so.63
60 U.S. v. Vazquez, 31 F. Supp. 2d 85 at 88 (D. Conn. 1998).
61 Indeed, this is the argument used in the private sector context by Google to rebuff
claims that Street View is privacy invasive. See e.g. “Street View will comply with
Canada’s privacy laws: Google” CBC News (25 September 2007), online: CBC
<http://www.cbc.ca/technology/story/2007/09/25/tech-google-streetview.html>.
62 See e.g. David Lyon, Surveillance Studies: An Overview (Cambridge: Polity Press,
2007) at 176. However, Lai suggests that in the Canadian context, it is not a foregone
conclusion that courts will flatly reject a reasonable expectation of privacy in public
spaces — Lai, supra note 59 at 67. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of Canada was
certainly deeply split (in Kang-Brown, supra note 21) over the appropriate threshold
(reasonable and probable grounds or reasonable suspicion) that would trigger the abil-
ity of police to use sniffer dogs in a public bus terminal. Similarly, Paton-Simpson
notes that the emerging law around the tort of invasion of privacy seems to go both
ways on the issue (Paton-Simpson, supra note 15 at 314–316). Still, there are indica-
tions that the law of Quebec, at least, favours some degree of privacy in public space.
See Aubry, supra note 26; See also Tremblay, supra note 28.
63 See e.g. David Lyon, “Surveillance as Social Sorting: Computer Codes and Mobile
Bodies” in Lyon, ibid. at 13–30; Lai, supra note 59 at 51; Kevin D. Haggerty & Rich-
ard V. Ericson, “The New Politics of Surveillance and Visibility” in Kevin D. Haggerty
& Richard V. Ericson, eds., The New Politics of Surveillance and Visibility (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 2007) 3–25 at 5; Uteck, supra note 2 at 88–91, also dis-
cusses the impact that ubiquitous computing will have on the nature, quality and vol-
ume of location information that it will generate.
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Further, the capture of this location information changes its character from a
simple observation to a record, which in turn raises its own privacy implications. A
record is more tangible and concrete than an observation, it may also be more pre-
cise, more enduring, more easily located, matched and mined. The number and
character of potential viewers of the recording may change dramatically. Recorded
acts also achieve a relative level of permanence, and this record alters their signifi-
cance and consequences. Passing through public view is quite different from being
recorded in public view.64
Thus, at the point at which information about one’s activities has been re-
corded by a private sector actor, the information at issue is no longer a simple ob-
servation. As Bennett and Crowe note, there is “an important distinction between
the routine capture of personal data and the subsequent analysis of that data for the
purposes of making a decision about that person.”65 Indeed, this is recognized by
the fourth factor in the Tessling analysis — whether the information was in the
hands of a third party.
II. DATA IN THE HANDS OF THIRD PARTIES
In Canada, the applicability of data protection legislation in the private sector
creates an additional and important layer to the analysis of the reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in location data. Data protection legislation operates within a con-
sent-based paradigm, where one is considered to have expressly or impliedly con-
sented to the collection of the data under certain terms and conditions. Those terms
and conditions may outline whether, and under what conditions, the data may be
shared with agents of the state. In addition, specific provisions of data protection
statutes may also permit the sharing of this data with law enforcement officials
without the data subject’s consent.
In an environment where private sector actors are in a position to collect and
compile a rich body of data that tracks our movements and activities, it is crucial to
understand the relationship between data protection legislation and one’s reasona-
ble expectation of privacy regarding the information collected about one. This issue
has exploded in the internet context, with a series of cases dealing with the excep-
tions for disclosure of information without consent to law enforcement officials
64 Colin Bennett, Charles Raab & Priscilla Regan, “People and Place: Patterns of indivi-
dual identification within intelligent transportation systems” in David Lyon, ed., Sur-
veillance as Social Sorting: Privacy Risk and Digital Discrimination (N.Y.: Routledge,
2005) 151–175 at 157. Bennett et al make the point that the public nature of the activity
of driving changes its character when ITS is used to collect and record extensive data
about individual drivers. See also Reg Whitaker, “A Faustian Bargain? America and
the Dream of Total Information Awareness” in Kevin D. Haggerty & Richard V. Eric-
son, eds., The New Politics of Surveillance and Visibility (Toronto: University of To-
ronto Press, 2007) 141 at 141-142.
65 Colin J. Bennett & Lori Crowe, “Location-Based Services and the Surveillance of Mo-
bility: An Analysis of Privacy Risks in Canada”, Report to the Office of the Privacy
Commissioner of Canada (June 2005) at 8, online: University of Victoria
<http://web.uvic.ca/polisci/bennett/pdf/lbsfinal.pdf>.
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under PIPEDA.66 It has also received media attention in the context of the Techni-
cal Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (BILL C-47), a Bill that is currently before
Parliament.67
One of the contextual factors in the Tessling analysis is “whether the informa-
tion was already in the hands of third parties; if so, was it subject to an obligation
of confidentiality?” There are two threads here. The first suggests that there is a
lower expectation of privacy in information that has already “escaped” from the
control of the individual and is in the hands of a third party. The second is that an
expectation of privacy may survive this “escape” if the third party owes an obliga-
tion of confidence to the individual.68
Location data is typically collected and recorded either by a public or a private
sector entity and, thus, is usually in the hands of a third party. Data protection
legislation imposes legal obligations on those who collect, use and disclose per-
sonal information, and may place strict limits on the situations in which informa-
tion may be disclosed to others without the data subject’s consent. In the case of
location information, PIPEDA is particularly important, as it will apply to data in
the hands of telecommunications organizations such as internet service providers
and cell phone companies.69 In a world of mobile communications, these service
providers will increasingly gather detailed location information about their clients.
Depending upon the circumstances, PIPEDA’s provisions will also apply to a wide
range of other organizations that collect, use or disclose personal information in the
course of commercial activity.
These situations — where location information or other personal data is
sought by government from private sector third parties — sit on the cusp between
data protection legislation (which governs the collection, use or disclosure of per-
sonal information by private sector entities) and the Charter (which balances pri-
vacy interests with the interests of the state). If data protection legislation gives an
open-ended discretion to companies to disclose personal information to police
without the data subject’s consent, and without need for judicial authorization, a
person’s reasonable expectation of privacy in this information would certainly
seem to be diminished.70
This tension between a reasonable expectation of privacy and data protection
law is evident in recent case law. There have been a series of court decisions in-
66 PIPEDA, supra note 11.
67 Bill C-47, supra note 13.
68 In analyzing the decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal in Tessling, Lisa M. Austin,
“One Step Forward or Two Steps Back? R. v. Tessling and the Privacy Consequences
for Information Held by Third Parties” (2004-05) 49 Crim. L.Q. 22, critiques an ap-
proach to information privacy that assumes a loss of a privacy interest once one’s per-
sonal information is in the hands of a third party.
69 Where a service provider is a provincial crown corporation, it is possible that provin-
cial legislation may apply. See R. v. Trapp, 2009 SKPC 5, [2009] S.J. No. 32, 2009
CarswellSask 48 (Sask. Prov. Ct.) [Trapp].
70 Nouwt, supra note 3 at 397-398; also writes about the risks to privacy that arise if
collections of private sector location data become too easily accessible to law enforce-
ment officials.
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volving s. 8 Charter challenges to the way in which police obtained customer infor-
mation from internet service providers (ISPs), which they then linked to IP ad-
dresses associated with online child pornography-related activities. The cases raise
a cluster of inter-related issues, including: the meaning to be given to “lawful au-
thority” in s. 7(3)(c.1) of PIPEDA, the relevance of a privacy policy to the determi-
nation of the reasonable expectation of privacy, and the possibility that a reasonable
expectation of privacy may exist vis à vis the state with respect to some information
regardless of the terms of the privacy policy or the language of the relevant data
protection statute.
Data protection legislation sets normative boundaries for the collection, use
and disclosure of personal information. Such legislation is generally premised on
consent-based models, and it is usual for the terms and conditions for collection,
use and disclosure of personal information to be set out in privacy policies linked to
consumer contracts. PIPEDA, along with its substantially similar provincial coun-
terparts,71 provides limited exceptions for disclosures of personal information with-
out consent. For example, PIPEDA contains a specific provision addressing the dis-
closure of personal information held by an organization for law enforcement
purposes:
7(3) . . . an organization may disclose personal information without the
knowledge or consent of the individual only if the disclosure is
. . . .
(c.1) made to a government institution or part of a government
institution that has made a request for the information, identified
its lawful authority to obtain the information and indicated that
(i) it suspects that the information relates to national
security, the defence of Canada or the conduct of in-
ternational affairs,
(ii) the disclosure is requested for the purpose of en-
forcing any law of Canada, a province or a foreign
jurisdiction, carrying out an investigation relating to
the enforcement of any such law or gathering intelli-
gence for the purpose of enforcing any such law, or
(iii) the disclosure is requested for the purpose of ad-
ministering any law of Canada or a province;
The interpretation of this provision has been a matter of some recent contro-
versy. Disclosure without consent may be made to a government institution where
it has “identified its lawful authority to obtain the information.” If “lawful author-
ity” means a court order or search warrant, then clearly this sort of information,
sought for the purposes of law enforcement or national security, may only be dis-
closed without the consent of the data subject where such a warrant or order is
obtained. However, it is not clear whether “lawful authority” means either judicial
authorization, or perhaps specific statutory authority granted under a relevant stat-
71 Supra note 25.
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ute.72 Some courts have indicated that a police officer’s “lawful authority” might
simply be his or her status as an agent of the state carrying out an investigation.73
The interpretation to be given to this provision is important in that it creates an
avenue through which data in the hands of third party organizations can be ac-
cessed by law enforcement with few checks and balances. The blurring between
information gathering by the state and information gathering by the private sector is
a matter of concern that has been raised by the Privacy Commissioner of Canada.
In an appearance before the Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy
and Ethics Commissioner Stoddart stated: 
[W]e’re also concerned about the increasing blurring of the lines between
the private sector and the public sector. In Canada, we’re used to the state
carrying out laws, certainly carrying out criminal law and national security
issues. With a change to PIPEDA that came about two years ago, organiza-
tions in Canada are now mandated to specifically request information, to
collect it for the express purpose of giving it to the national security
authority.74
Commissioner Stoddart was referring to the amendment to PIPEDA which ad-
ded s. 7(1)(e), which permits organizations to gather information without consent
for the purposes of handing it over to national security officials.75 This is distinct
from s. 7(3)(c.1) in that it involves pro-active data gathering, and may turn the data
collector into an agent of the state whose activities would be subject to review
under s. 8 of the Charter.76 Nevertheless, there is still a blurring of the lines be-
tween public and private with disclosure of personal information under s. 7(3)(c.1)
to the extent that there is a vast store of personal information that is potentially
open to the scrutiny of state authorities. The terms under which these agents of the
state may gain access are crucially important to individual privacy.
(a) The Cases
As noted earlier, there has been a flurry of case law dealing with the interpre-
tation of s. 7(3)(c.1) in relation to internet subscriber information. These cases in-
volve investigations relating to child pornography, and reflect a context in which
there is a strong motivation to see the perpetrators brought to justice. Yet, the issues
raised in these cases are not exclusive to that context. Section 7(3)(c.1) potentially
enables a flow of personal information between private sector companies and law
enforcement officials across a broad range of law enforcement issues. In the discus-
72 See e.g. Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.), s. 231.2. These provisions
permit officials to have access to certain records in specified circumstances.
73 See e.g. Wilson, supra note 51; Vasic, supra note 51.
74 Standing Committee on Access to Information, Privacy and Ethics, 39th Parl., 1st Sess.,
No. 003 (5 June 2006) at 1539.
75 Section 7 of PIPEDA was amended by the Public Safety Act, 2004, c. 15, s. 98. In the
U.S. context, the actions of some large private sector companies post 9–11 in turning
over large volumes of consumer data to law enforcement officials raised substantial
concerns about privacy in that country. See Robert O’Harrow Jr., No Place to Hide
(New York: Free Press, 2005); Whitaker, supra note 64.
76 Israel et al., supra note 8 at 11.
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sion below, the three main issues considered by the courts will be addressed. These
are 1) the meaning of “lawful authority” in s. 7(3)(c.1) of PIPEDA; 2) the signifi-
cance of the terms of privacy policies; and 3) whether there is a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in the information at issue.
(i) Interpreting “Lawful Authority”
A number of Canadian cases have considered whether “lawful authority” in
PIPEDA means judicial authorization, or whether it can simply mean identifying
the credentials of the requestor. In C. (S.), Re,77 a child pornography case, police
used a “Letter of Request” to obtain subscriber data from the accuseds’ ISP. The
court described this request as having been made “under the authority of
P.I.P.E.D.A..”78 In considering the meaning of “lawful authority”, Conacher J.
found that the existence of a criminal investigation was not, on its own, “lawful
authority.”79
In R. v. Kwok,80 police sought subscriber information to match with an IP
address linked to child pornography-related activities on the internet. The Internet
Service Provider (ISP) provided the information to police on request, without judi-
cial authorization. It was argued that this violated the s. 8 rights of the accused. In
considering the Charter issues, Justice Gorewich took into account the role of
PIPEDA in creating a reasonable expectation of privacy in the data in the hands of
the ISP. He observed that prior to PIPEDA, officers regularly used warrants to ob-
tain the type of information at issue in the case. Thus, one of the issues was
whether PIPEDA altered that status quo by removing the requirement to obtain a
warrant. Justice Gorewich noted that s. 7(3)(c.1) of PIPEDA requires a requesting
party to identify its lawful authority to obtain the desired information. That party
must also indicate that the information is required for the purpose of enforcing a
law of Canada. He found that it is reasonable to find that “lawful authority” can
include a person’s authority as a police officer. He stated “[g]iven the stated pur-
pose of the Act, and in particular s. 7(3)(c), to hold it means only a warrant does
not make any logical sense.”81
In R. v. Mahmood82 the court considered the legality of a series of warrants
issued for the dump of a significant volume of call data from cell phone towers
based on the geographic location of the calls. The case does not resolve the “lawful
authority” question because the warrants obtained by police were ruled invalid and,
therefore, could not constitute “lawful authority” to obtain the data. However, Jus-
tice Quigley does express support for the view that “lawful authority” means judi-
77 C. (S.), Re, 2006 CarswellOnt 5732, 2006 ONCJ 343 (Ont. C.J.) [C. (S.), Re].
78 Ibid. at para. 3.
79 Ibid. at para. 9.
80 Kwok, supra note 51.
81 Ibid. at para. 32. Section 7(3)(c) permits disclosure without consent to comply with a
subpoena or warrant.
82 Mahmood, supra note 53.
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cial authorization. This expectation of privacy is further bolstered by PIPEDA.83
Justice Quigley writes: 
Clearly PIPEDA requires that a police authority seeking personal informa-
tion, such as that disclosed in both the Tower Dump Records and the Sub-
scriber Records, provide the cellular phone service provider with either a
subpoena or warrant issued by a court or other authorized person or body.
Alternatively, at a minimum, if it actually entails a lesser standard (which to
my mind is not immediately evident), a governmental authority seeking
such information must have identified its lawful authority to obtain the in-
formation and indicated it is required for purposes of law enforcement or in
furtherance of an investigation.84
Justice Quigley stops short of categorically stating that “lawful authority” means
judicial authorization. In doing so, he suggests that there might be some circum-
stances where something less than a warrant (and perhaps not much more than a
police officer identifying herself and stating she is investigating a crime) would be
required.
The interpretation of s. 7(3)(c.1) of PIPEDA may also be affected by the over-
arching reasonableness principle in s. 5(3) of PIPEDA. This section provides that:
“An organization may . . . disclose personal information only for purposes that a
reasonable person would consider are appropriate in the circumstances.” The per-
mission to disclose without consent in s. 7(3)(c.1) may be limited by s. 5(3) to
disclosure only where a reasonable person would consider it appropriate to disclose
the information without a warrant.85 If this is the case, then the issues of the terms
of any privacy policy and the general privacy interest in the information at issue are
highly relevant.
(ii) The Significance of Privacy Policies
In R. v. Ward,86 another internet child pornography case, the court found that
there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in customer data held by an ISP.
The data had been provided to the police by the ISP in response to a written request
that was not supported by judicial authorization. The terms of the company’s pri-
vacy policy, incorporated by reference into the customer contract, provided that
customer data would not be released to police without “lawful authority” — lan-
guage similar to that used in s. 7(3)(c.1) of PIPEDA. Justice Lalande interpreted
this to mean that the customer had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the data
vis à vis law enforcement agents presenting lawful authority. Unfortunately, his
analysis avoided interpreting “lawful authority.” If “lawful authority” means judi-
cial authorization, then customers do have an expectation that their personal data
will not be turned over unless a search warrant is presented. On the other hand, if
83 Quigley J. cites BMG Canada Inc. v. John Doe, [2004] 3 F.C.R. 241 (F.C.); affirmed
(2005), 2005 CarswellNat 1300 (F.C.A.) on this point.
84 Mahmood, supra note 53 at para. 74.
85 For a discussion of the normative impact of s. 5(3), see Lisa M. Austin, “Is Consent the
Foundation of Fair Information Practices? Canada’s Experience Under PIPEDA”
(2006) 56 U.T.L.J. 181.
86 Ward, supra note 52.
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“lawful authority” simply means that a police officer need only identify herself as a
police officer investigating a crime, then it would be more appropriate to conclude
that a customer has very little, if any, expectation of privacy in their information vis
à vis state authorities.
The reliance on a privacy policy to find that there is no reasonable expectation
of privacy is apparent in other cases as well. For example, in R. v. Wilson,87 Justice
Leitch was also faced with a Charter claim by an accused charged with child por-
nography related charges. The police had used a letter to the ISP to obtain customer
data that ultimately linked the accused with the offending internet activities. The
“lawful authority” asserted in the request was the status of the requester as a police
officer. Justice Leitch endorsed the approach that examined the privacy policy of
the ISP in Ward. In this case, the subscriber agreement indicated that the ISP would
disclose personal information without knowledge or consent in order to comply
with a subpoena or court order, or “as may be otherwise required by law.” In her
view, this negated any reasonable expectation of privacy in the information. How-
ever, as in Ward, it is not clear how that language actually indicates that informa-
tion will be disclosed without a subpoena or warrant, merely on the permissive
language of s. 7(3)(c.1). After all, s. 7(3)(c.1) does not actually require the disclo-
sure of information without consent.
In Mahmood,88 which considers the reasonable expectation of privacy in loca-
tion data outside the internet context, the court found that the contracts between cell
phone providers and their clients, backed by data protection legislation, created a
reasonable expectation of privacy in this data. In the view of Justice Quigley, this
expectation was very much a product of the existence of data protection legislation,
which set clear limits on the collection, use and disclosure of personal informa-
tion.89 Quigley J. noted that the various cell phone contracts incorporated by refer-
ence the companies’ privacy policies. These privacy policies indicated that personal
information would not be provided to the authorities without “lawful authority.”
Quigley J. found that “[t]his gave them a legitimate and reasonable objective ex-
pectation of privacy in the records provided to the police by the cell phone service
providers.”90
In R. v. Vasic,91 the court also considered the role of the service contract in
determining the reasonable expectation of privacy. The Account Holder Agreement
with the ISP, Rogers, stated that “all information kept by Rogers regarding you, as
the account holder, other than your name, address and listed telephone number, is
confidential and may not be disclosed by Rogers to anyone other than you.”92 For
Justice Thorburn, the express exclusion of the name, address and telephone number
from the list of information that Rogers undertook to keep confidential meant that
the subscriber could have no reasonable expectation of privacy in the information.
87 Wilson, supra note 51.
88 Mahmood, supra note 53.
89 Ibid. at para. 56.
90 Ibid., at para. 73.
91 Vasic, supra note 51.
92 This extract is cited in Vasic, ibid. at para. 11. The emphasis is added by the Court.
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It would appear that data protection legislation does play a role in determining
the reasonable expectation of privacy an individual may have in their personal in-
formation in the hands of the police. Section 7(3)(c.1) is not determinative of the
issue — it is permissive in nature. Courts clearly look to the terms of any service
agreement or privacy policy between the service provider and the data subject. Un-
fortunately, these terms have not always been entirely clear, and courts have, thus
far, not been generous towards the expectations of data subjects in interpreting
them. It is important to keep in mind, however, that in the majority of these cases,
the data sought has been in the hands of ISPs.
In both Vasic and Ward the courts were prepared to find that any reasonable
expectation of privacy could be negated by the existence of a customer agreement
that permitted disclosure of the information to law enforcement without knowledge
or consent of the customer. Yet, it should not be so readily assumed that a customer
agreement or privacy policy can be taken automatically to obliterate a reasonable
expectation of privacy in data in the hands of third parties. Many such polices are
not read by consumers for a variety of reasons.93 It may be artificial to find that a
person’s expectation of privacy in data they did not realize was being collected or
retained is governed by an agreement of which they were largely unaware. As
Pomerance notes, 
[p]ersonal data is constantly acquired, stored and disseminated by govern-
ment and private agencies. Information has often been sold or transferred
without our permission or even knowledge. Even knowledge of such trans-
fers does not necessarily imply a full appreciation of the consequences.94
Courts should take care to ensure that the data subject had proper notice of the
terms of the policy. The obliteration of the reasonable expectation of privacy is
more palatable in contexts where the service being provided (such as internet ser-
vice) is one that can be used for either legal or illegal purposes. In such a context,
subscribers are likely aware that their online activities may have repercussions. A
party using the service for illegal purposes who does not inform himself of the
service provider’s reporting policies may be considered willfully blind to the terms
of the agreement. In other contexts, where, for example, location data in the hands
of third party companies is more incidental to the goods or services provided, it
may be less appropriate to tie the reasonableness of the data subject’s expectation
of privacy to the terms of a privacy policy. If the data is of a kind in which a
reasonable expectation of privacy exists, it may not be constitutionally appropriate
for law enforcement officials to seek it without judicial authorization.
93 For example, a recent study by the Canadian Internet Policy and Public Interest Clinic
found that many privacy policies are very lengthy, and some require a reader to consult
multiple documents (at 6). The same study found that many policies were difficult to
understand (at 19). See Canadian Internet Policy and Public Interest Clinic, Compli-
ance with Canadian Data Protection Laws: Are Retailers Measuring Up? (April 2006),
online: CIPPIC <http://www.cippic.ca/uploads/May1-
06/PIPEDAComplianceReport.pdf>.
94 Pomerance, supra note 48 at 234.
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Even if one accepts the view of some courts that the clear terms of a customer
agreement can completely negate any expectation of privacy,95 the wording of s.
5(3) — the overarching requirement that disclosure may only be for purposes that a
reasonable person would consider are appropriate in the circumstances — may af-
fect the analysis. If this is the case, then regardless of the terms of the agreement,
the data subject may retain an expectation of privacy in the data that would prevent
disclosure without judicial authorization. This would occur if the data is of a kind
in which a strong and reasonable expectation of privacy would exist.96 Of course, it
is also open to consider that the reasonable person would consider it appropriate to
disclose the information without consent where the individual has clearly agreed to
these terms. However, notwithstanding a privacy policy that indicates that certain
information may be disclosed to police without an individual’s knowledge or con-
sent, for example, it might not be reasonable for a third party data processor to
respond to a request for data about a large number of individuals.
(iii) The Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in the Information at Issue
If a service contract is not to be relied upon, or if its wording is ambiguous, a
further issue is whether a reasonable expectation of privacy exists in the informa-
tion at issue. The issue may also arise where a privacy policy makes it clear that the
company may, at its own discretion, disclose information to police pursuant to a
police request and without judicial authorization. Such an analysis focuses on the
nature of the information. This issue has been considered by the courts in the ISP
cases. For example, in addition to finding that the service contract did away with
any reasonable expectation of privacy, Justice Leitch in Wilson went further and
found that the information in question — a subscriber’s name and address — did
not qualify as personal information in which there was a reasonable expectation of
privacy.97 She categorized it as “information available to anyone in a public direc-
tory and it does not reveal, to use the words of Sopinka J. in Plant, ‘intimate details
of the lifestyle and personal choices or decisions of the applicant.’”98 In reaching
this conclusion, she explicitly rejected the finding of Justice Gorewich in R. v.
95 See e.g. the decision in Vasic, supra note 51.
96 In this regard some of the recent cases have been very disappointing. In Wilson, supra
note 51, for example, the court took the view that a name and address were not core
biographical information and, thus, carried no reasonable expectation of privacy, not-
withstanding the fact that this information was the key needed to unlock the “meaning”
of the IP address in the hands of the police and, thus, to link online activities (in which
a much greater expectation of privacy must surely exist) with the ISP subscriber. A
similar disappointing conclusion was drawn in R. v. Trapp, supra note 69. However,
the courts in Kwok, supra note 51; Ward, supra note 52; and Vasic, supra note 51,
seemed to reach different conclusions.
97 This view appears to be supported in Israel et al., supra note 8 at 17.
98 Wilson, supra note 51 at para. 51. This approach, which considers the customer data as
having no privacy implications because it is public information, and which assesses it
as an isolated, decontextualized piece of information, is precisely what is criticized as
inappropriate in an information society by privacy theorist Helen Nissenbaum — Helen
Nissenbaum, “Toward an Approach to Privacy in Public: Challenges of Information
Technology” (1997) 7(3) Ethics & Behaviour 207.
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Kwok that such information, because it is needed to link a person to an IP address
associated with certain behavior on the internet, did in fact amount to information
that “would tend to disclose intimate details of lifestyle and choices.”99
In R. v. Vasic100 Justice Thorburn was prepared to accept that “disclosure of
the name and municipal address, to someone who possesses the IP address, may
provide the holder of the IP address with ‘details of the lifestyle and personal
choices of the individual.’”101 In C. (S.), Re, the court found that the subscriber
information was information in which “a citizen would have an expectation, and a
reasonable one, of privacy.”102 In the cell phone context, the court in Mahmood
considered that the cell phone call data contained, at least in part, “some of the
elements of biographical core”, particularly “some general identification of move-
ment, of personal associations, and of frequency of contact with associated
persons.”103
In R. v. MacInnis104 Ferguson J. considered an application to exclude as evi-
dence the cell phone records of the accused’s common law wife. The accused,
Knight, cohabited with his common law spouse, Larmand, and they had a child
together. Each subscribed to a different cell phone service. There was evidence to
show that during the period covered by the indictment, Knight frequently used Lar-
mand’s cell phone.
The court considered whether there was a privacy interest in cell phone usage
data. Ferguson J. noted that a number of cases in Canada had held that a person 
has no privacy interest in the telephone number, subscriber information
(such as their name, address, etc.) and even in the call detail information for
cell phones which records the numbers called, the times and length of calls
and the general location of their cell phone by reference to cell tower
involvement.105
99 Kwok, supra note 51 at para. 35. This view of subscriber information has subsequently
been endorsed, in the civil context in Ontario, in Warman v. Wilkins-Fournier (2009),
[2009] O.J. No. 1305, 2009 CarswellOnt 1665 (Ont. S.C.J.). This case is currently on
appeal to the Ontario Court of Appeal. The approach in Warman in characterizing the
nature of the information is distinctly different from that of the Federal Court of Appeal
in BMG Canada Inc. v. John Doe, 2005 FCA 193, [2005] 4 F.C.R. 81 (F.C.A.). In that
case, the Court appears to accept that information about internet activities, when linked
with a subscriber’s identifying information could be “highly confidential” — BMG,
ibid. at para 44.
100 Vasic, supra note 51.
101 Ibid. at para. 54, citing Plant, supra note 44.
102 Supra note 77 at para. 6.
103 Ibid. at para. 77.
104 R. v. MacInnis (2007), [2007] O.J. No. 2930, 2007 CarswellOnt 4770 (Ont. S.C.J.); R.
v. MacInnis (2007), [2007] O.J. No. 2937, 2007 CarswellOnt 4817 (Ont. S.C.J.).
105 Ibid. at para. 32. The court referenced the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in R. v.
Plant, supra note 44, noting that in Plant, the court indicated that “the focus should be
on whether the records contain a biographical core of personal information which indi-
viduals in Canada would wish to keep private.” Plant, ibid. at para. 35.
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For example, the court cited the decision of the Alberta Court of Appeal in R.
v. Pervez,106 which found that the accused had no privacy interest in cell phone
records because the records “do not reveal intimate details of Pervez’s lifestyle or
personal choices.”107 By contrast, in R. v. Bryan, the court found that cell phone
billing information “has a confidential informational component readily distin-
guishable from the intrusion on privacy flowing from disclosure of hydro
records.”108 In R. v. Cole,109 the court was prepared to recognize only a fairly lim-
ited privacy interest in cell phone call data, stating: “[t]he accused’s expectation of
privacy in the cell phone records was low given the nature of the commercial
records and their substance.”110
In MacInnis, Ferguson J. distinguished earlier case law that found that there
was generally no reasonable expectation of privacy in cell phone usage records on
the basis that PIPEDA has now overtaken this case law, and had created a privacy
interest in phone records. He stated: “[s]ince the information collected with respect
to cell phone numbers relates to the subscriber, the Act creates an objective expec-
tation of privacy for the subscriber.”111 He also noted that s. 492.2 had been added
to the Criminal Code, providing a form of search warrant process “to justify the
installation of number recorders which would capture some of the information
available from cell phone providers.”112 In his view, this suggests that “parliament
considered that individuals have a privacy interest in such information.”113 He con-
cluded that “there is no doubt now that an individual telephone subscriber has a
privacy interest in his or her own telephone data collected by a service pro-
vider.”114 He also extended this expectation of privacy to “some persons whose
personal information is contained in the records relating to a subscriber.”115 He
expressed the principle in these terms: 
If the cell phone is used by a person other than the subscriber, with the
consent of the subscriber, then in my view the user has a reasonable, subjec-
tive expectation that the information will be kept confidential. The statutory
duty to keep the information confidential creates an objective expectation of
privacy for such users.116
It is not clear whether the conclusion by Ferguson J. that PIPEDA creates a
reasonable expectation of privacy in cell phone call data is meant to survive the
presence of a subscriber agreement or privacy policy that negates this expectation.
106 R. v. Pervez (2005), [2005] A.J. No. 708, 2005 CarswellAlta 810 (Alta. C.A.).
107 Ibid. at para. 12.
108 R. v. Bryan (1999), [1999] O.J. No. 5074, 1999 CarswellOnt 4787, ¶14 (Ont. S.C.J.).
109 R. v. Cole (2006), [2006] O.J. No. 1402, 60 W.C.B. (2d) 611, 2006 CarswellOnt 2157
(Ont. S.C.J.).
110 Ibid. at para. 32.
111 Ibid. at para. 44.
112 Ibid. at para. 45.
113 Ibid.
114 Ibid. at para. 46.
115 Ibid. at para. 48.
116 Ibid.
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In Kwok, in spite of his finding that a warrant was not required by s. 7(3)(c.1)
in all circumstances, Justice Gorewich went on to consider the privacy interest in
the information at issue. He noted that there was no evidence before him as to the
terms of the contract between Rogers and the accused regarding the confidentiality
of the subscriber information. Absent this evidence, he concluded that the informa-
tion at issue in this case “would tend to disclose intimate details of lifestyle and
choices.”117 Because of the nature of the information, the acquisition of such infor-
mation by law enforcement officials “should be scrutinized by a neutral body, a
judicial authority.”118 This did not occur in the case before him. He found that
there were no exigent circumstances to justify proceeding without a warrant.
In R. v. MacInnis, Ferguson J. criticized earlier cases that had found no rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in cell phone usage data. He considered these cases
to be incorrectly decided “because they proceed on the assumption that telephone
data is not capable of revealing a biographical core of personal information.”119 As
noted earlier, Ferguson J. was of the view that PIPEDA had created a privacy inter-
est in cell phone data in the hands of a private sector company. Beyond this, how-
ever, he criticized the earlier cases for being “based on an erroneous characteriza-
tion of the facts of Canadian lifestyles.”120 In his view, cell phone information is
highly sensitive. Even though actual conversations are not part of the data, the data
can reveal who called, when and from where. This information “may well reveal
the intimate details of the lifestyle and personal choices of the user.”121 The pri-
vacy interest would extend to all members of a household using the same service.
The majority of courts, therefore, unlike Justice Leitch in Wilson, seem to ac-
cept that data cannot be viewed as atomized pieces, but its sensitivity must be eval-
uated in the context in which it is sought, and the use to which it will be put.122
Pomerance warns of the risks to privacy posed by viewing information as small
fragments in an age of data mining. She writes, “[z]ero plus zero does not always
equal zero and, like a jigsaw puzzle, a very clear picture can emerge when other-
wise unintelligible pieces are fit together. This process can strike very poignantly at
what we call the biographical core.”123 Kerr and McGill refer to the “jigsaw nature
of the data/information/knowledge/wisdom chain.”124 They also challenge the ap-
proach that views information as “smaller and smaller bits of data which, through
the reductive process, eventually no longer reveal a biographical core of informa-
tion.”125 Where identifying information can be linked to information about a per-
117 Ibid. at para. 35.
118 Ibid.
119 Ibid. at para. 49.
120 Ibid.
121 Ibid. at para. 50.
122 Note that privacy theorist Nissenbaum, supra note 98 at 216, has described as an erro-
neous assumption the view that an “aggregation of information does not violate privacy
if its parts, taken individually, do not.”
123 Pomerance, supra note 48 at 234-235.
124 Kerr & McGill, supra note 54 at 431.
125 Ibid. at 414. Emphasis in original.
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son’s activities, then the composite information is information regarding which a
person has a reasonable expectation of privacy.
III. OTHER DATA PROTECTION STATUTES
A comparison with the language used in other private sector data protection
statutes such as those in Alberta and B.C. might bolster the argument that lawful
authority means something less than a warrant, leaving organizations with a fairly
broad discretion to disclose. Alberta’s PIPA,126 and B.C’s PIPA,127 both permit
disclosure without knowledge or consent for law enforcement purposes, and neither
mentions “lawful authority.”128 A similarly worded provision in Saskatchewan’s
public sector data protection legislation129 was considered by the Saskatchewan
Provincial Court in R. v. Trapp.130 In that case, the public sector statute applied
because the internet service provider was a provincially-owned crown corporation.
The court found, as a result of the wording of the statute, which placed no limits on
the licence granted to private sector companies to disclose information to law en-
forcement officials, it could not find that the constitutional rights of the accused
had been violated.131
The provisions in PIPEDA’s provincial counterparts are, like s. 7(3)(c.1), per-
missive and not mandatory. Private sector organizations are required to comply
with data protection norms. A private sector organization should be governed by
the terms of its privacy policy, which will typically form part of the agreement
between it and its customers. In this way, data protection legislation, by requiring
private sector organizations to be clear about how they will treat their clients’ per-
sonal information, may create a reasonable expectation of privacy in that informa-
tion even in jurisdictions with broad permissive disclosure provisions. A company
that says that it will not volunteer personal information to police authorities without
its clients’ consent is within its rights to insist upon judicial authorization prior to
any disclosure.
126 PIPA (Alberta), supra note 25, s. 20(f).
127 PIPA (B.C.), supra note 25, s. 18(j).
128 A similar kind of provision was considered by the Saskatchewan Provincial Court in R.
v. Trapp, supra note 69. The court found that, as a result of the wording of the statute,
it could not find that the constitutional rights of the accused had been violated.
129 Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, 1990-91, c. F-22.01 [FOIPP].
130 Supra note 69.
131 Section 29(2) of FOIPP, supra note 129, provides: (2) Subject to any other Act or
regulation, personal information in the possession or under the control of a government
institution may be disclosed:
. . . .
(g) to a prescribed law enforcement agency or a prescribed investigative body:
(i) on the request of the law enforcement agency or investigative body;
(ii) for the purpose of enforcing a law of Canada or a province or territory or
carrying out a lawful investigation; and
(iii) if any prescribed requirements are met
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(a) The Investigative Powers for the 21st Century Act and the Technical
Assistance for Law Enforcement in the 21st Century Act
In the spring of 2009, the federal government introduced two new Bills, both
of which are aimed at updating the criminal law, including powers of investigation,
to address issues raised by new technologies. The Bills are intended to implement
Canada’s obligations under the Convention on Cybercrime.132 The Bills do not re-
present Canada’s first attempt to ratify this Convention. An earlier attempt, the
Modernization of Investigative Techniques Act (Bill C-74)133 died on the order pa-
per during the term of the Liberal minority government in 2006. Bill C-74 proved
controversial, and it was widely criticized by privacy advocates and ordinary
citizens.134
The Investigative Powers for the 21st Century Act (Bill C-46)135 and the Tech-
nical Assistance for Law Enforcement in the 21st Century Act (Bill C-47)136 each
contain provisions that are relevant to the issue of location information in the hands
of third parties. For example, in Bill C-46, new provisions for obtaining either pro-
duction orders or warrants for tracking data set the terms and conditions under
which such orders will be granted. The Bill distinguishes between obtaining author-
ization to track transactions and things, and authorization to track individuals. The
tracking of transactions and things requires only a “reasonable suspicion”,137
whereas the tracking of individuals requires the judge to be satisfied that there are
reasonable grounds to believe that an offence has or will be committed, and that the
tracking of the individual will be of assistance in the investigation.138 The Bill also
provides for judicial authorization to obtain tracking data in the hands of third par-
ties on a reasonable suspicion standard.139 Thus, even if data tracks the movement
of individuals, if it is in the hands of a third party, only a reasonable suspicion
standard applies to a request for a production order for the data. With the growing
involvement of the private sector in collecting location data for a broad range of
products and services, the lower threshold is problematic.
It is also significant that Bill C-46 does not affect decisions by third parties in
possession of such data to volunteer the information to the police. Section 487.0195
provides:
487.0195(1) For greater certainty, no preservation demand, preservation or-
der or production order is necessary for a peace officer or public officer to
ask a person to voluntarily preserve data that the person is not prohibited by
132 Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime, 23 November 2001, ETS No. 185. The
Convention was signed by Canada on 23 November 2001.
133 Bill C-74, Modernization of Investigative Techniques Act, 1st Sess., 38th Parl., 2004.
134 Daphne Gilbert, Ian R. Kerr & Jena McGill, “The Medium and the Message: Personal
Privacy and the Forced Marriage of Police and Telecommunications Providers” (2007)
51 Crim. L.Q. 469.
135 Bill C-46, supra, note 13.
136 Bill C-47, supra, note 13.
137 Bill C-46, supra note 13, s. 492.1(1).
138 Ibid., s. 492.1(2).
139 Ibid., s. 487.017.
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law from preserving or to voluntarily provide a document to the officer that
the person is not prohibited by law from disclosing.
This does more than leave s. 7(3)(c.1) undisturbed; it goes some way to supporting
the view that no warrant or judicial authorization is necessary for the disclosure to
law enforcement of information in the hands of third parties.
Bill C-47 would, if enacted, have an impact on some of the issues raised by
the case law on access to data in the hands of third party ISPs. In particular, the Bill
provides:
16. (1) Every telecommunications service provider shall provide a person
designated under subsection (3), on his or her written request, with any in-
formation in the service provider’s possession or control respecting the
name, address, telephone number and electronic mail address of any sub-
scriber to any of the service provider’s telecommunications services and the
Internet protocol address, mobile identification number, electronic serial
number, local service provider identifier, international mobile equipment
identity number, international mobile subscriber identity number and sub-
scriber identity module card number that are associated with the sub-
scriber’s service and equipment.
Such a provision would remove the need for investigators to obtain warrants to
access a broad range of subscriber information that would link individuals to activi-
ties on the internet, as well as to activities trackable through the use of cell phones
or other location-based applications that use telecommunications facilities. Gilbert
et al. argue that this approach to subscriber data flows from a view that there is a
low expectation of privacy in this data.140 Yet, where the disclosure of this data
may have the consequence of revealing one’s activities, thoughts and assumptions,
it is difficult to see why this lower level of protection is warranted.
These provisions are defended by government as being necessary to ensure
that law enforcement and national security officials have quick access to basic in-
formation needed to follow leads in developing investigations. They cite uneven
practices as necessitating a clear legislative provision: 
[T]he practices of releasing this information to police forces and CSIS vary
across the country: some service providers release this information to law
enforcement immediately upon request; others provide it at their conve-
nience, often following considerable delays; while others insist on law en-
forcement obtaining search warrants before the information is disclosed.
This lack of national consistency and clarity can delay or block
investigations.141
140 Gilbert et al., supra note 134 at 484.
141 Public Safety Canada, “Technical Assistance for Law Enforcement in the Twentieth
Century Act” (18 June 2009), online: Public Safety Canada
<http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/media/nr/2009/nr20090618-1-eng.aspx>.
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Safeguards to protect privacy are offered in terms of a limited list of persons desig-
nated to make the requests under the legislation, and internal as well as external
oversight of the exercise of the powers.142
In the consultations by Public Safety Canada and Industry Canada related to
customer name and address information in 2007, the Office of the Privacy Com-
missioner of Canada criticized a similar proposal for enhanced access by law en-
forcement to subscriber information. The Commissioner argued that the proposal
lacked the evidentiary basis necessary to justify such changes to the status quo. She
argued that s. 7(3)(c.1) of PIPEDA already governed the issue of access by law
enforcement to data in the hands of third parties. She stated that she supported
certain clarifications to the wording of this section that would reduce some of the
uncertainties surrounding its use — particularly the addition of a definition of “law-
ful authority.” She was of the view that with these changes, s. 7(3)(c.1) and
PIPEDA as a whole, would suffice to govern access by law enforcement to data in
the hands of third parties.143 The Commissioner also criticized the assumption
made in the consultation document (and present as well in Bill C-47) that customer
name and address information carried with it a low expectation of privacy. She
noted that not all CNA data was publicly available. Further, she observed: 
While some of this information might be considered less sensitive we need
to recognize that it is typically not being sought as an end in itself. CNA
information may be valuable to LE/NS [law enforcement/national security]
agencies specifically because it can provide access to even more sensitive
information.144
Certainly in the context of internet based activities, CNA information is the key
that links a range of internet based activities to a specific individual.
Although s. 16 of Bill C-47 applies only to telecommunications service prov-
iders, the impact of this provision on the issues discussed in this paper would be
significant. This is particularly the case because so many location-based applica-
tions already operate over the mobile networks of telecommunications companies.
These are not just applications related strictly to the use of these facilities as a
medium for communication; increasingly they relate to global positioning systems,
or other applications that run in the background as people carry out day-to-day
activities.
Even if enacted, underlying constitutional issues may still affect s. 16 if, for
example, it is found to conflict with the Charter right to be free from unreasonable
142 Only designated persons may make requests for subscriber information (s. 16(3)), and
the number of such persons is limited — Bill C-47, supra note 13, s. 16(4). Neverthe-
less, an officer may make a demand without being a designated person in “exceptional
circumstances” (s. 17). Records must be kept of all requests (s. 18), and regular internal
audits of these records are mandated (s. 20).
143 Jennifer Stoddart, Privacy Commissioner of Canada, “Customer Name and Address
(CAN) Information Consultation Document: Response of the Office of the Privacy
Commissioner of Canada to Public Safety Canada” (October 2007), online: Office of
the Privacy Commissioner of Canada
<http://www.priv.gc.ca/information/pub/lar_071108_e.pdf>.
144 Ibid. at 6.
220   CANADIAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY [7 C.J.L.T.]
search or seizure in particular contexts. Bill C-47 also does not resolve the broader
issue of law enforcement access to all the different types of location data in the
hands of private sector companies. For businesses other than telecommunications
companies that collect location data and other customer personal information, the
issues around access by law enforcement to this information under permissive data
protection legislation remains.
CONCLUSION
Although our activities in public space were once subject mainly to casual
observation by others who shared that space, the situation is different in our highly
technological and data-driven society. As individuals carry out their daily activities,
they leave detailed data trails not just on the internet, but as they move through
public space. The old adage that there is no privacy in public spaces is no longer
adequate to deal with the nature and amount of data that is gathered about us as we
carry out our daily activities. Activities in public space are increasingly represented
and recorded as “data.” Expectations of privacy in our activities must, therefore, be
considered under an information privacy analysis.
In this context, the data protection dimensions of the reasonable expectation of
privacy are enormously important. The reduction of our daily activity to a data
record — or a series of data records necessitates a change in how we conceive of
privacy. Although it is still possible for law enforcement officials to carry out
tracking and surveillance activities in their own right, they are increasingly reliant
upon data collected and compiled by third parties. As the quality and the detail of
that data increases, this creates a highly specific record of individual activities and
movements. Indeed, vast quantities of location information are collected by private
sector companies — from details of our virtual travels across the internet, to track-
ing information in the form of cell phone records, transaction data, or data from
RFID tags in automated toll passes, swipe cards and other RFID enabled devices.
Data protection legislation inherently creates an expectation of privacy in the
data collected by others in private sector contexts. While data protection legislation
also creates exceptions to the consent rule for disclosure of this information, the
existence of a reasonable expectation of privacy should mean that the exceptions
are narrowly construed, and that “lawful authority” must mean express statutory
authority or judicial authorization. Any other approach would mean that the private
sector collection, use and disclosure of its huge volumes of data would provide a
rich resource for law enforcement officials, and an opportunity to do an end run
around established privacy norms.
In a similar vein, even absent express “lawful authority” language, the permis-
sive disclosure provisions of statutes like British Columbia and Alberta’s Personal
Information Protection Acts should not be taken to automatically eliminate any rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in the data. Compiled location data, revealing as it
does a pattern of movements and associations is highly sensitive information of a
kind that it may simply not be reasonable for a third party company to disclose
without the request for judicial authorization to establish that the data is being
sought for constitutionally legitimate ends. 
